Microfinance games / 
Xavier Gine ...[et al.]. 
 - Washington, D.C. :  World Bank,  2006. 
 - 45 p. :  ill. ;  23 cm. 
 - Policy research working paper ;  3959 .
 - Policy research working papers (Online) ;  3959. .
<br/><br/> Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2006. 
<br/><br/>Includes bibliographical references. 
<br/><br/> "Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets.  But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements.  In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection.  The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way.  They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal.  The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site. 
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<br/><br/><br/>System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. <br/>Mode of access: World Wide Web. 
<br/><br/><label>LCCN: </label>2006618424 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Microfinance--Peru--Lima.<br/>Game theory.
<br/><br/><label>LC Class. No.: </label>HG3881.5.W57 
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>332.2	  / MIC 2006