TY  - BOOK
AU  - Gine,Xavier
ED  - World Bank.
TI  - Microfinance games
T2  - Policy research working paper
AV  - HG3881.5.W57 
U1  - 332.2	 
PY  - 2006///
CY  - Washington, D.C.
PB  - World Bank
KW  - Microfinance
KW  - Peru
KW  - Lima
KW  - Game theory
N1  - Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2006; Includes bibliographical references; Also available in print
N2  - "Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets.  But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements.  In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection.  The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way.  They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal.  The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site
ER  -