Infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries /
Emmanuelle Auriol and Pierre M. Picard, Research working paper Collection Title:Policy.
- Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2006.
- 42 p. ; 23 cm.
- Policy research working paper ; 3950 .
- Policy research working papers (Online) ; 3950. .
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/28/2006.
Includes bibliographical references.
"The paper analyzes governments' tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in privatization reforms of noncompetitive industries in developing countries. Under privatization, the control rights are transferred to private interests so that public subsidies decline. This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of price increases for consumers. In developing countries, tight budget constraints imply that privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments. For highly profitable public utilities, the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical budgetary conditions may favor public ownership. Finally, once a market segment gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to regulate the industry. In the absence of a credible regulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership. "--World Bank web site.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
2006618542
Infrastructure (Economics)--Developing countries. Public utilities--Developing countries. Privatization--Developing countries.