Microfinance games / Xavier Gine ...[et al.].
Material type:
TextSeries: Policy research working papers (Online) ; 3959.Publication details: Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2006. Description: 45 p. : ill. ; 23 cmSubject(s): Microfinance -- Peru -- Lima | Game theoryDDC classification: 332.2 LOC classification: HG3881.5.W57Also available in print.Abstract: "Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site.
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Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre Library General Reading Room | 332.2 MIC 2006 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | Zahid | WB5493 |
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2006.
Includes bibliographical references.
"Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site.
Also available in print.
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