Infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries / Emmanuelle Auriol and Pierre M. Picard, Research working paper Collection Title:Policy.
Material type: TextSeries: Policy research working papers (Online) ; 3950.Publication details: Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2006. Description: 42 p. ; 23 cmSubject(s): Infrastructure (Economics) -- Developing countries | Public utilities -- Developing countries | Privatization -- Developing countriesDDC classification: 338.925091724 LOC classification: HG3881.5.W57Also available in print.Abstract: "The paper analyzes governments' tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in privatization reforms of noncompetitive industries in developing countries. Under privatization, the control rights are transferred to private interests so that public subsidies decline. This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of price increases for consumers. In developing countries, tight budget constraints imply that privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments. For highly profitable public utilities, the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical budgetary conditions may favor public ownership. Finally, once a market segment gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to regulate the industry. In the absence of a credible regulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership. "--World Bank web site.Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode |
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Books | Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre Library General Reading Room | 338.925091724 AUI 2006 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | Zahid | WB5491 |
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Includes bibliographical references.
"The paper analyzes governments' tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in privatization reforms of noncompetitive industries in developing countries. Under privatization, the control rights are transferred to private interests so that public subsidies decline. This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of price increases for consumers. In developing countries, tight budget constraints imply that privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments. For highly profitable public utilities, the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical budgetary conditions may favor public ownership. Finally, once a market segment gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to regulate the industry. In the absence of a credible regulatory agency, regulation is achieved through public ownership. "--World Bank web site.
Also available in print.
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